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I. History of Conflicts Between Mining Regulation and Takings Law
N o discussion o f the takings doctrine would be complete without a thorough review o f 
its impact and relevance to the mining industry, for many o f the most important takings law 
cases have involved mining operations. Perhaps the most famous o f all o f these was the decision 
by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. M ahon, 260 U .S. 393 (1922) which ushered in 
the era o f the regulatory takings law. Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge to the Kohler Act, 
a state statute which forbade, in certain circumstances, the mining o f coal which caused surface 
subsidence o f the land overlying buildings and other structures. In striking down the
r
Pennsylvania statute, Justice Holmes offered what is perhaps the most frequently cited passage 
of any takings law case: ”[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if  regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." at 415. Just how far is "too far" is a 
question which has perplexed courts and legal scholars alike for many decades.
The difficulty in answering this question is perhaps best illustrated by the Court’s 1987 
decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U .S. 470 (1987). The 
facts in Keystone Bituminous are remarkably similar to the facts in Pennsylvania Coal. That 
case involved another Pennsylvania state statute which was designed to limit surface subsidence 
from underground coal mining. In particular, coal operators were prohibited from removing 
more than 50% o f the coal resources which were located under certain protected structures. A 
five member majority o f the Court sustained the law, distinguishing the Pennsylvania Coal case 
in two important respects; first the Court found that the statute in Keystone Bituminous was 
clearly enacted under the state’s police powers to protect broad public interests including 
preserving the property tax base, promoting public safety, and in protecting water resources. 
By contrast, the court characterized the statute involved in Pennsylvania Coal as having been 
enacted to promote private property interests. Second, the Court held that the 50% rule 
established by the state statute did not go "too far" since there was no evidence that coal mining 
became commercially impractical as a result o f the rule. This contrasted with a contrary finding
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in Pennsylvania Coal.
The Supreme Court had previously addressed the commercial impracticality issue in 
Goldblatt v. Town o f  Hempstead, 369 U .S. 590 (1962). Goldblatt involved a town ordinance 
which prohibited excavations below the water table, thus effectively foreclosing Goldblatt’s sand 
and gravel mining operation. Goldblatt argued that the ordinance effectively prevented it from 
continuing its business and thus constituted a taking. The Court conceded that the ordinance 
prohibited a beneficial use to which the property was previously devoted, but held that, where 
the ordinance is a valid exercise o f the police power, a regulation that "deprives the property 
o f its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional." Id. at 594. The Court noted that 
the fact that the use o f the soil itself was precluded, as opposed to a use upon the soil, was not 
controlling, nor was the fact that the "use prohibited is arguably not a common-law nuisance." 
Id. The Court did, however, comment on common-law nuisance as a foundation for regulatory 
validity, thus foreshadowing the decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (1992): "A prohibition simply upon the use o f property for purposes that are declared, by 
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety o f the community, cannot, in 
any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation o f property for the public benefit." Id. 
at 593.
Goldblatt focused on the validity o f the regulatory ordinance under the police power, 
applying the familiar standard o f reasonableness. Moreover, the Court made clear that debatable 
questions o f reasonableness should be left to the legislature. A similar rationale was used less 
than a month later in Consolidated Rock Products Company v. City o f  Los Angeles, 370 P.2d 
342 (1962) appeal dismissed, 371 U .S. 36 (1962), to uphold a zoning ordinance that precluded 
Consolidated’s sand and gravel operations. The trial court found the property had no 
appreciable economic value for any other purpose. There was testimony before the legislative 
body that other uses were practicable, however, it "determined that the prohibited use cannot 
be had without injury to others." Id. at 348. The California Supreme Court conceded that "the 
value of the property for any of the described uses is relatively small i f  not minimal" when 
compared with its value for gravel extraction but affirmed on the grounds that where reasonable 
minds might differ the courts should defer to legislative findings. Dismissing Consolidated’s
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reliance on Pennsylvania Coal, and other early takings cases, as inapplicable to current 
principles o f comprehensive zoning, the court noted that "public welfare and public convenience 
do control and are in themselves terms constantly adjusted to meet new conditions." at 352. 
Goldblatt and Consolidated emphasize that the regulatory takings doctrine is an evolving 
concept, where the reasonableness of the regulation and enforcement means are primarily 
determined by the legislative branch o f government.
The final mining case which bears review is the 1981 decision in H odel v. Virginia 
Surface M ining and Reclamation A ss’n, 452 U .S. 264 (1981). H odel is important for a simple 
proposition: takings claims are "ad hoc" factual inquiries. In H o d e l ,  Mining Association had 
argued that the steep slope provisions of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
V
Act (which established strict standards for mining operations on slopes greater than 20°) violated 
the takings clause since coal operators simply could not meet the Act’s strict standards. The 
Court treated the claim as a "facial challenge" requiring the Court to determine whether mere 
enactment of the law constituted a taking. The Surface Mining Act easily survived such scrutiny. 
In its decision, however, the Court made clear that closer scrutiny might be afforded where the 
law was applied to "particular property" where parties produced "particular estimates of 
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the unique circumstances." Id. at 295.
II. The Lucas D ecision and Prospects for Future Conflicts Between Mining 
Regulation and Takings Law
It is fairly easy to document the significant impact that mining regulation has had on the 
takings doctrine, and the reasons for this impact are not particularly surprising. Mining tends 
to displace other uses o f land both on and off-site. Such displacement often results in 
government restrictions on the location and manner o f mining — restrictions which in turn lead 
to takings claims.
Although it does not itself concern mining, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) has special relevance to the 
displacement issue which so often arises in mining cases, and thus offers important insights into 
how the Court may resolve future takings disputes which arise in the context o f mining 
operations. In 1988, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act.
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In enacting this law, the legislature had found, among other things, that the beach/dune system 
"provides the basis for a tourism industry that generates approximately two-thirds of South 
Carolina’s annual tourism industry revenue" and that development too close to the beach "has 
jeopardized the stability o f the beach/dune system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent 
property." Id. at 2897, n.10. The Act prohibited M r. Lucas from developing two lots which 
he had purchased on a barrier island along the South Carolina coast in 1986. The South 
Carolina Supreme Court denied Lucas’s takings claim, believing itself bound by the uncontested 
findings o f the legislature "that new construction in the coastal zone--such as petitioner intended- 
-threatened this public resource." Id. at 2890.
The Court reiterated “two discrete categories o f regulatory action as compensable without 
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support o f the restraint: ... [1] 
regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical ‘invasion’ o f his property ... and 
[2] where the regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use o f land .” Id. at 
2893-94. (The Court did not address partial regulatory takings in Lucas but reiterated that an 
“ad hoc factual inquiry” is required where a partial taking is claimed. Id. at 2893, ( citng Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U .S. 104, 124 (1978).)
In Lucas, the Supreme Court abandoned the harmful or noxious uses principle relied on 
in prior cases as a “touchstone to distinguish regulatory ‘takings’ -- which require compensation 
— from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.” Id. at 2899. Justice Scalia 
noted “that the distinction between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that which 
“confers benefits” is difficult, if  not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis.” 
Id. Instead the Court looked to traditional nuisance law to aid in its analysis. Nuisance law 
offers a balancing test that looks to the “degree o f harm to public lands and resources, or 
adjacent private property, ... the social value o f the claimant’s activities and their suitability to 
the locality in question, ... and the relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided 
through measures taken by the claimant and the governm ent. . . ” Id. at 2900.
W hile the Court stressed “that an affirmative decree eliminating all economically 
beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application o f relevant 
precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
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presently found” (Id. at 2902, n.18) it left open the possibility that “changed circumstances or 
new knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so .” Id. at 2901
The Court’s “total taking” inquiry does not appear to preclude a total ban on mining 
activity, such as that upheld in Consolidated Rock Products, where a nuisance can be 
established; however, Lucas signals an emerging reluctance to defer, without question, to 
legislative findings. Additionally, the Court intimated that the antecedent inquiry must be into 
the nature o f the owner’s estate and its relevant entitlement (Id. at 2899), an inquiry closely 
related to the owner’s “investment-backed expectations” which “are keenly relevant to takings 
analysis generally.” Id. at 2895. Thus, where the subsurface estate is segregated, or 
theoretically may be segregated, from the surface estate, a takings claim may be more likely to 
succeed. Furthermore, in a footnote, the Court appears to suggest that where the economically 
beneficial use o f a substantial portion o f a large holding is precluded by regulation, the property 
interest against which the loss may be measured may not include the entire holding. Id. at 2894, 
n.7.
III. Contemporary Problems Relating to Mining Regulation and Takings Law
A. H ard rock m ining: Takings law poses significant issues for those concerned about 
hard rock mining reform. Among other things, issues have been raised with respect to taking 
away from mining claimants the right o f patent, and limiting all mining in certain areas which 
are deemed unsuitable, or which cannot meet stringent regulatory standards. The government’s 
authority to withhold from mining claimants the right to patent has been sustained in at least one 
case before the U .S. Court o f Claims. Fres v. United States, 639 F .2d 754 (Ct. Cl. 1981), 
cert, denied, 454 U .S. 827 (1981). According to that court, a vested right to the issuance of 
a patent does not arise until there has been full compliance with procedures set out in the mining 
laws.
The closest examples o f how regulatory requirements might infringe upon mining rights 
come from analogous situations under the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. 
As the H odel case suggests, however, it may be difficult for a person to show that the reform 
law, on its face violates the takings clause, whatever that law might say. A contemporary
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example o f how the debate over mining restrictions is likely to take shape comes from the New 
World Mine proposed by the Crown Butte Mine Company, at a location just outside Yellowstone 
National Park .1 Should the proposed mining operation be disapproved, as some have advocated, 
or should the regulatory burdens be too onerous for a viable mining operation, Crown Butte may 
well claim a taking o f its property.
A final issue that will be discussed in the context o f mining law reform concerns the 
proposed imposition o f mineral royalty payments. I f  royalty payments are imposed on what is 
already a marginal mining operation, the added cost might well force the operator out o f 
business. In this situation, the operator may well claim that the imposition o f royalty payments 
effected a taking o f his property.
B. Coal Mining: The debate over takings under the federal Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act has matured well beyond that in the hard rock area, and undoubtedly offers 
some insight into how those issues will be resolved. Some key takings issues under the federal 
Surface Mining Act remain, however. These include a longstanding debate over the definition
1 In 1987, Crown Butte Resources Ltd. applied to Montana for a hard-rock mining permit to mine 
Henderson Mountain, just outside of Yellowstone National Park, where it discovered 1.7 million ounces 
of gold, 11 million ounces of silver and 65,000 tons of copper. If the permit is approved, 350 
construction workers would work on the facilities for two years and 175 miners would be employed for 
12 to 15 years. Yellowstone Park’s resource management specialist, Stu Coleman, says it would be 
“foolish to allow this.” He notes that the tailings impoundment would be on Fisher Creek, a tributary 
of the only federally designated wild a scenic river in Wyoming, the Clark’s Fork of the Yellowstone 
River. (Gary Gerhardt, West’s New Battleground Crown Butte’s Plan fo r  a Mine Sets O ff White-Hot 
Environmental Battle Around Yellowstone Park, Rocky Mountain News, Oct. 3, 1993. Although Crown 
Butte spokesperson Mark Whitehead says that “[o]ur mine poses absolutely no risk to Yellowstone 
National Park,” and the company proposes to use mechanical milling instead of cyanide leaching to 
extract the metals, critics believe the burial of 5.5 million tons of acid-bearing mine tailings could 
threaten the Clark’s Fork. Louis Sahagun, Battle Lines Drawn in the Sands Over Mining Near 
Yellowstone, Los Angeles Times, Nov. 16, 1993. Crown Butte says the tailing impoundment would be 
state-of-the-art, able to withstand a 500-year flood and major earthquakes. Id. EPA engineer Wes 
Wilson said “[t]here’s certainly no good site” for the tailings impoundment and the EPA has “urged” 
officials to consider other sites. EPA Urges Mining Firm To Change Plan Company Needs Better Place 
fo r  Tailings Than One Proposed Drainage Near Yellowstone, Rocky Mountain News, May 1, 1994. The 
EPA wants more time to finish work on the environmental impact statement for the mine, delaying the 
estimated completion of the document until late 1995. EPA Wants Further Study o f Mine Plan Agency 
Wants Time To Weigh Each Proposal fo r Montana Gold Operation, Rocky Mountain News, Jan. 14, 
1994
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of """""'valid existing rights'  (VER). This phrase was used by Congress in SMCRA in an attempt 
to avoid legislative takings o f private property in those circumstances where lands are designated 
as unsuitable for mining. 30 U .S .C . §1272(e). Since the first efforts were made to define the 
term in 1979, however, controversy has raged over the proper construction of the term .2 The 
panelists will review the history o f the debate, and suggest the likely direction o f the current 
efforts which have been initiated by the new Director o f the Office o f Surface Mining, Robert 
Uram.
The panelists will also review the question left open by the H odel decision referenced 
above; that is, the extent to which specific applications o f the restrictions contained in the federal 
law might lead to valid takings claims. For example, i f  an operator can demonstrate that her 
mineral estate has lost all value because it cannot be extracted in accordance with environmental 
standards established by the law, has a taking occurred for which compensation is owed? The 
panelists will consider this issue both generally, and in the context o f particular areas where it 
is likely to arise, as for example with the stringent steep slope and prime farmland provisions 
of the law.
Finally , the panelists will discuss the fallout from the Whitney Benefits case. Whitney 
Benefits is the owner o f 1,327 acres in the Powder River Basin o f Wyoming, including the 
appurtenant mineral rights. A substantial portion of the Whitney Benefits coal reserves lie
2 The Office of Surface Mining (OSM) adopted its first VER rule in 1979. Robert Uram, A Critical 
Review o f Valid Existing Rights Under SMCRA, 5-WTR Nat. Resources & Env’t 19 (1991) [hereinafter 
Review] Under the rule "(1) all existing mining operations, (2) all mining operations which had applied 
for and received ’all permits’ needed to mine by August 3, 1977, and (3) lands on which coal was both 
needed for, and immediately adjacent to, an ongoing surface coal mining operation for which all permits 
were obtained prior to August 3, 1977" were considered valid existing rights. Id. The rule, along with 
hundreds of other regulations, was challenged in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 
14 E.R.C. 1083 (D.D.C. 1980). The court held that "a good faith attempt to obtain all permits before 
the August 3, 1877 cutoff should suffice for meeting the all permits test." Id. at 1090-92. In 1983, the 
"all permits rule was abandoned and replaced with a fifth amendment takings standard which was also 
challenged and remanded because it failed to comply with the public notice requirements of the 
Administrative Procedures Act. Review. In December 1988, the OSM proposed yet another version of 
VER which was formally withdrawn in July of the following year. Review. Finally on Thursday, April 
28, 1994, the OSM invited comments on the revision of an environmental impact statement "which 
analyzed the environmental impact of the alternatives for rulemakings that would (1) define the term Valid 
Existing Rights (VER)." 59 Fed Reg. 21996 (1994). Final action on this new effort will not likely occur 
before 1995.
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beneath an alluvial valley floor (AVF). SMCRA precludes most surface mining within AVFs 
in the West. After an initial effort to work out an exchange o f its coal lands for other federal 
coal lands, Whitney Benefits filed a takings claim in the United States Claims Court. The 
Claims Court initially denied the claim; on remand, however, the court found that a taking had 
indeed occurred and awarded more than $140 million to Whitney Benefits. (Whitney Benefits
II), 18 Cl.Ct. 394 (1989). (The award included prejudgment interest from the date o f the taking- 
-enactment o f SMCRA—and attorney’s fees.) The Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
affirmed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 
F.2d 1169 (Fed.Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 406 (1991). In February 1994, the Court 
o f Federal Claims held that Whitney was entitled to receive interest compounded annually, rather 
than simple interest, as just compensation for the taking. Whitney Benefits Inc. v. United States, 
30 Fed.C l. 411 (1994). Finally, in April 1994, the government was denied its motion for a new 
trial, which alleged that evidence proffered in the apportionment proceeding cast doubt upon the 
fairness and accuracy o f the court’s valuation. Whitney Benefits Inc. v. United States, 1994 W L 
163855.
The substantial encroachment on the federal purse that is supported by the Whitney 
Benefits decision suggests another important takings law issue: To what extent should the 
government or the claimant be able to choose the remedy -- invalidation o f the regulation or 
compensation — for a violation of the takings clause. In the Whitney Benefits case, given the 
costs involved, the federal government might well have preferred to allow mining to go forward 
rather than enforcing the regulation that otherwise applied. But in most takings cases, neither 
the government nor the private party likely have much choice as to the remedy. This conclusion 
follows from the Supreme Court’s decision in Preseault v. ICC, 494 U .S . 1 (1990). Presault 
involved the constitutionality of the federal "rails to trails" statute. The Court refused to address 
the merits o f Preseault’s takings claim, instead holding that Preseault’s remedy, if  any, was in 
the Federal Claims Court under the Tucker Act. In so holding, the Court appears to have 
relegated most takings cases into that forum. Under Preseault, the Claims Court is the sole 
forum for resolving takings claim unless the relevant statute specifically withdraws the Tucker 
Act remedy. Id . at 12 Since few enactments mention the Tucker Act, or the appropriate
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remedy in an alleged takings situation, virtually all takings claims appear destined for the Claims 
Court. Aside from the policy implications of this rule, the Preseault decision may pose 
problems for persons challenging the imposition o f government regulations.
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